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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LAURA LEE BLOXHAM FULLMER,
No. 870499-CA

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
BRIAN KEITH FULLMER,

g o r y No. 7

Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The C o u r t
domestic

of

Appeals

relations

has

matter

appellate

pursuant

jurisdiction

to

over

this

U.| C.A. Section 78-2a-

3(2)(g).

NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a final Order Modifying Decree of the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding, in
which the lower court modified the previously entered Decree of
Divorce as to child custody, child support, alimony, and federal
and state tax exemptions.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON AP >EAL
I.

Did the trial court err when it ruled that there had

been, since the time of the decree, substantial and material
1

changes in the circumstances upon which the previous custody award
was based?
II*

Did t h e

plaintiff's

trial

transition

court

err

when

it

ruled

that

from p a r t - t i m e employment t o

the

full-time

employment and the placement of the minor child in a day care
center

constituted

substantial

a change

and m a t e r i a l

of

circumstances

to j u s t i f y

sufficiently

reopening the question of

custody?
III.

Did t h e

trial

court

err

when i t

ruled

that

the

remarriage of defendant, the non-custodial parent, to a full-time
homemaker, c o n s t i t u t e d

a change of c i r c u m s t a n c e s

s u b s t a n t i a l and m a t e r i a l to j u s t i f y

sufficiently

reopening the q u e s t i o n of

custody?
IV.

Even had the t r i a l court c o r r e c t l y found t h a t changes of

circumstance e x i s t e d ,
joint

did the t r i a l

c o u r t e r r when i t

awarded

custody of the c h i l d to the p a r t i e s and p h y s i c a l

care,

custody and control to defendant?
V.

Did the t r i a l court err when, in modifying the award of

child custody, i t ruled that defendant should pay p l a i n t i f f

the

sum of $250.00 per month during the three-month summer v i s i t a t i o n
awarded to p l a i n t i f f ?
VI.

Did the t r i a l court err when i t set the previous award

of alimony for review in one year?
VII.

Did the t r i a l court err when i t awarded defendant the

1987 and 1988 federal and s t a t e
2

income tax exemptions for

the

minor child to defendant?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(3)
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care,
or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and
necessary.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from a final Order Modifying Decree entered
after a trial on Defendant-Respondent!s Amended Petition to Modify
and Plaintiff-Appellant!s Counter Petition tb Modify in the Fourth
District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding, in which the lower
court modified the Decree of Divorce signed by Judge David Sam on
February 19, 1985.
B.

Course of the Proceedings.

The Decree of Divorce in this matter wai originally signed by
Judge David Sam of the Fourth Judicial District Court on February
19, 1985 and became final three months late**, May 19, 1985.
22-23)

In that decree, plaint iff-appe llant

(R.

(hereinafter

"plaintiff") was awarded custody of the minorf child, child support
of $150.00 per month, and alimony of $200.00 |per month.

The issue

of tax exemptions was not addressed.
Defendant-Respondent (hereinafter "defendant") filed his
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce

3

in September, 1986,

requesting that child custody be awarded to him (R. 28), and his
Amended Petition to Modify in February, 1987 (R. 62), requesting
an elimination of alimony and an award to him of the state and
federal tax exemptions.

Plaintiff filed her Counter Petition to

Modify in October, 1986, requesting an increase in the amount of
child support awarded to her.

(R. 49)

Trial was held on October 13, 1987 before Judge Boyd L. Park.
(R. 183)
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.

After the trial on October 13, 1987, Judge Boyd L. Park ruled
from the bench, finding:

(1) that there had been material changes

of circumstance, and (2) that he was entitled to consider the
matter of custody.

(R. 67)

The lower court found that the following constituted a
material change of circumstance:
(a)

The change in plaintiff ! s work schedule to full-time

employment, which had necessitated the placement of the minor
child, Dagin, in a day care center on a full-time basis.
(b)

(R. 195)

The remarriage of defendant and his creation, thereby,

of a stable home environment where the child could be cared for by
a stepmother who was a homemaker, not working outside the home,
during those times when the defendant was working.

(R. 195)

Having found the necessary change of circumstances, the
lower court made the following findings regarding the issue of
child custody:
4

(a)

That

the

minor

child

should

dwell

in a stable

environment, and that the defendant could pr|ovide better stability
and was in a better position to take care of the minor child at
the present time.

(R. 196)

(b) That the plaintiff had less time available to spend with
the minor child, as she was working full-time.
(c)

That there had been

significant

(R. 199)
changes

in the

environment and goals of the plaintiff, and |that there had been a
considerable
defendant.

degree of stability of th^ environment in the

(R. 199)

(d) That the day care center in which [the minor is enrolled
appeared to be an excellent facility, but tl^at the stepmother had
developed an excellent loving relationship with the minor child
and would be available as a homemaker in the| home at times needed
by the child.

The Court also found thatl the minor child had

seemed to develop an excellent appropriate relationship with his
stepsister.

(R. 199)

(e) That the custody of the minor child should be modified
to award joint custody to both parties, with the actual physical
care, custody and control being awarded to the defendant, and that
the issue of child custody should be reviewed in one year.

(R.

195-196)
(f)

That the $200 per month alimony should not be presently

discontinued, but that this issue should be Reviewed in one year.
(R.196)
5

(g)

That plaintiff should not pay child support to defendant

at such times as he has custody, but that the defendant should pay
to the plaintiff the sum of $250.00 per month during the threemonth summer visitation during which she shall have custody.

(R.

196-197)
(h)

That defendant should be awarded the 1987 and 1988

federal and state income tax exemptions, as he was and is the
primary care provider for the bulk of those tax periods.

(R. 197)

Conclusions of Law consistent with the above findings were
prepared and filed with the Findings of Fact.

(R. 200-202)

The

Order Modifying Decree awarded joint custody of the minor child to
the two parties, with actual physical care, custody and control
awarded to defendant.

Plaintiff was not ordered to pay child

support at such times as the defendant had actual custody of the
child; defendant was ordered to pay plaintiff $250.00 per month
during the three-month summer visitation period.

The defendant

was awarded the 1987 and 1988 federal and state tax exemptions.
The previous award of alimony was not modified nor mentioned in
the final Order, although the Findings of Fact indicated that the
Court would review the alimony award in one year.
D.

(R. 204-206)

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Plaintiff and defendant were married on November 22, 1980 in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

(R. 1, 268)

The only child of the parties,

a son, Dagin Lester Fullmer, was born on May 19, 1983.
255)

(R. 1,

Plaintiff filed her divorce Complaint on September 17, 1984
6

in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utih County.

(R. 1, 254)

The parties entered into an Amended Stipulation, which was filed
with the court on February 19, 1985.

(R. 10, 254)

The Decree of

Divorce, which incorporated the terms of the Amended Stipulation,
was signed by Judge David Sam of the Foiirth Judicial District
Court on February 19, 1985 and became fina jl three months later,
May 19, 1985.

(R. 22-23, 255-256)

In that decree, plaintiff was

awarded custody of the minor child, child support of $150.00 per
month, and alimony of $200.00 per month.

The issue of federal and

state tax exemptions was not addressed. (R. |22-23)
Prior to the parties' divorce, plainttiff worked part-time,
approximately three to four hours per day.

At the time of the

divorce, plaintiff began working part-time and attending school
from one to four hours per day.

(R. 253)

Defendant remarried

after the Decree of Divorce became final, and a child was born
approximately four months thereafter to defendant and his new
wife.

(R. 257)

Defendant filed his Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce in
September, 1986 requesting modification of zhe

decree regarding

child custody (R. 28), and later filed his Amended Petition to
Modify in February, 1987 requesting modifiq ation of the decree
regarding alimony and the state and federal tax exemptions.
62)

(R.

Plaintiff filed her Counter Petition to Modify in October,

1986 requesting modification of the decree rejgarding the amount of
child support.

(R. 49)

Plaintiff was served with the defendant's Petition to Modify
Decree the night before she was to move to New York City with the
minor child of the parties.

At that time, she had moved out of

her apartment in Provo and had sold or given away most of her
furniture and belongings that required larger storage facilities.
(R. 285)

As plaintiff literally had nowhere to live, she and her

child stayed temporarily with a friend in Provo, until they moved
to Sunset, Utah, where plaintiff's parents took them in.
290)

(R. 285,

The money she had saved for the move to New York City was

used to retain an attorney.

When she was financially able, she

moved into her own apartment in Salt Lake City.

(R. 285)

At the time plaintiff was served with the Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce, she had terminated her part-time employment
with the Brick Oven Restaurant in Provo in anticipation of her
move to New York City.

(R. 292)

She then found part-time

employment with Nelson Laboratories in Salt Lake City, where she
made a gross monthly salary of $444.00.

(R. 292, 83)

During this

time period, defendant made only sporadic payments of child
support and alimony.

(R. 286)

For example, on May 22, 1987, when

plaintiff signed her Affidavit for Pretrial, defendant was three
months behind on his child support and alimony, which sum would be
$1,050.

(R. 75)

Because she could not adequately support herself and the
child on a gross salary of $444.00 per month, plaintiff began to
work full-time, at the gross monthly salary of $950.00, for a Salt
8

Lake City law firm as a legal receptionist! during the summer of
1987, just a few months before the trial was held.
286)

(R. 156, 194,

As a necessary result of this new employment, the minor

child was placed in full-time child care at a day care center,
Tutor Time, in downtown Salt Lake City, not far from her new
employment.

Kindergarten instruction will also be available in

this facility when the minor child attains ;he age of five years.
(R. 285)
Since t h e time of t h e d i v o r c e and throughout t h i s
defendant

has been employed a t WICAT Systems,

Inc.

in Orem, Utah

where he r e c e i v e s a monthly g r o s s s a l a r y of $2,630.00.
does not work o u t s i d e t h e home.
Trial
plaintiff's

was

held

Counter

on

His wife

(R. 142, 2 7 | )

defendant's

Petition

litigation

on

km ended

Petition

O c t o b e r 13, 1987.

and

(R. 183)

Before the trial began, the attorneys met with the court in his
chambers, whereupon the court informed them that he had already
read the child custody evaluation report (R. 350-352).

Trial went

forward with proffered testimony, and Judg^ Park announced his
decision from the bench.

(R. 315-326)

Because the attorneys could not agree oh the language of the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and final Order Modifying
Decree, a further hearing was held on November 6, 1987, at which
time the attorneys and the court went through a set of the final
documents prepared by counsel for defendant.

(R. 329-365)

Counsel for plaintiff had marked her objections and proposed

changes in red ink on the copies given the court.

(R. 229-244)

Discussion was held and ultimate modifications were ordered by the
court.

Plaintiff's counsel moved for a Rule 62, Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, Stay of Execution of Judgment which was denied by
the court.

(R. 361-362)

The final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Modifying Decree were signed by Judge Park on November 10, 1987
and entered in the court record that same day.

(R. 193, 204)

Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal was also filed on November 10, 1987.
(R. 208)
Transfer of custody of the minor child did not occur, as
plaintiff's Motion for Stay of Judgment of District Court Pending
Appeal was granted by the Court of Appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The t r i a l

court

committed e r r o r

when i t

found

that

(1)

p l a i n t i f f ' s t r a n s i t i o n from part-time work and part-time school to
f u l l - t i m e work and the minor c h i l d ' s r e s u l t i n g placement in

full-

time child care and (2) defendant's remarriage constituted changes
of circumstance s u f f i c i e n t l y

s u b s t a n t i a l to warrant the reopening

of the child custody award.

The change of circumstances on the

plaintiff's
states

part was not s u b s t a n t i a l , and Utah case law

that

circumstance

defendant's
to

remarriage

be c o n s i d e r e d

in

was n o t

a custody

clearly

a change

of

modification

proceeding.
The court compounded i t s error when i t considered the issue
10

of child custody de novo and found that th^ same factors used as
changes of circumstance were also justifica tion for modifying the
previous award of custody, giving joint custody to both parties,
but awarding the physical care, custody and control to defendant,
The court clearly erred when it ruled that a substitute mother,
the stepmother in the instant case, would be highly preferable to
any day care facility and the child1 s natural mother together.
The court penalized the plaintiff for choosing to work full-time,
even though the court acknowledged that sh& was forced to work
full-time because of her finances.
The court committed further error by failing to adequately
justify its modification of the award c|f child

support to

plaintiff, by setting the previous alimony award for review when
it found no change of circumstances with re bpect to alimony, and
by awarding the 1987 and 1988 federal ajnd state income tax
exemptions for the minor child to defendant, finding that in 1987
he was the primary care provider because he paid $150.00 per month
for child support.

The court awarded him the 1988 exemptions on

the assumption that the child would be livinlg with defendant most
of the year.

This matter was also set for review in one year,

which was not necessary, in light of the! court's errors with
respect to the custody award.

11

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE
HAD BEEN, SINCE THE TIME OF THE DECREE, CHANGES IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE PREVIOUS CUSTODY AWARD WAS
BASED.
The bifurcated

procedure required by Utah case law in

modification of custody actions is most clearly enunciated in a
line of cases commencing with Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah
1982).

In Hogge the Utah Supreme Court determined the bifurcated

procedure involves (1) an initial decision that there are changed
circumstances warranting the court's reconsideration

of the

custody award, and then (2) a subsequent decision as to the manner
in which custody should be modified, if at all.

Id . at 53.

Unless the petitioner for a change in custody successfully carries
the burden in establishing the changed circumstances, the trial
court should not move on to a consideration of the custody issue.
Step one of this bifurcated process itself becomes a twopronged process or test:
[in] the initial step, the court will receive
evidence only as to the nature and materiality of any
changes in those circumstances upon which the earlier
award of custody was based. In this step, the party
seeking modification must demonstrate (1) that since the
time of the previous decree, there have been changes in
the circumstances upon which the previous award was
based; and (2) that those changes are sufficiently
substantial and material to justify reopening the
question of custody.
The trial court must make a
separate finding as to whether this burden of proof has
been met. If so, the court, either as a continuation of
the same hearing, or in a separate hearing, will proceed
to the second step. However, where that burden of proof
is not met, the trial court will not reach the second
step, the petition to modify will be denied, and the
existing custody award will remain unchanged.
12

Id, at 54.
In the instant case, the attorneys for] the parties attempted
to lead the trial court through the bifurcated process.

To that

end both attorneys made "opening statements," (R. 254, 260) in
which they proffered their evidence regarding the existence of
changes of circumstances regarding child custody, as well as the
other three issues in question, and argued! the case law dealing
with that requirement.

T

Despite the attorne ys

attempted division

of the evidence into the two steps, the trial 1 court did not make a
finding at the end of this proffered evidencje regarding changes of
circumstance, but rather allowed the coun sel for defendant to
commence presenting his case regarding all i ssues.

(R. 268)

After all evidence had been proffered by the attorneys, the
trial court ruled from the bench regarding the necessary changes
in circumstance, indicating that it was "not at all persuaded by
the little nick picky things that have been brought up here and
there."

(sic) (R. 347)

The trial court c|onsidered only two of

defendants alleged changes of circumstance:

(1 ) "[t]he fact that

the mother has obtained full time employment and is obligated as a
result of that to place the child in a day care center despite how
good that day care center is," further ex plaining the court's
belief that a day care center is "not a substitute for a mother in
the home," and (2) "the fact that the petitioner in this case has
remarried and established a stable home."

(ft. 195* 317)

The trial court, however, failed (and could not have, if it
13

had attempted) to relate these changes in circumstances to any
part of the previous award of custody in the original decree of
divorce, as required by Hogge.

It was only in the first

stipulation filed by the parties during the original divorce
action that one of the parties—the plaintiff—was designated "a
fit person to care for the physical and emotional needs of said
child."

(R. 8)

The findings, conclusions, and decree prepared by

plaintiff's original attorney failed to designate either party
again as a fit person to care for the minor child.

According to

all three final documents, the plaintiff was simply awarded
custody of the child.

(R. 18-23)

In order for the trial court to relate these two changes in
circumstance to any part of the previous award of custody in the
decree, the court would have had to find that plaintiff was
originally awarded custody of the child because she only worked
part-time, that the child had not been placed in a day care center
and that the defendant had not yet remarried!

Yet, the trial

court found that plaintiff's full-time work, the child's placement
in a day care center full-time, and the defendant's remarriage
were changes of circumstance worthy of examining the custody issue
de novo.
Defendant would have had the court believe that, at the time
of the divorce action, he understood that plaintiff would be the
primary caretaker of the child and that "she would raise the child
in her own home and he would pay her child support and pay her
14

alimony in response to the court's ord^r."
assertion by defendant

(R. 269)

This

flies in the face of all reality;

certainly, he did not anticipate that she pould adequately feed,
clothe, educate and house herself and their child on $150.00 child
support and $200.00 alimony per month.

Despite defendantTs

proffered testimony regarding this understanding, the trial court
did not refer to defendant's assertion in an y way and did not make
any finding regarding this testimony.
There was neither factual nor legal |justification for the
trial court's finding that plaintiff's full- bime work, the child's
placement in a day care center full-time , and the defendant's
remarriage were material changes of circumstance upon which the
previous award was based.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHE*J IT RULED THAT
PLAINTIFF'S TRANSITION FROM PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT TO
FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT AND THE PLACEMENT OF THE MINOR
CHILD IN A DAY CARE CENTER CONSTITUTED A CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENTLY SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL TO
JUSTIFY REOPENING THE QUESTION OF CUSTODY.
The second prong of step one of the Hogge analysis requires
that the trial

court

find

that the material

changes

of

circumstance upon which the previous custodi award was based are
sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the
question of custody.

The facts in the instant case simply do not

justify the court's finding in this matter.
Plaintiff's proffered testimony was that, prior to the
parties' divorce, plaintiff worked part-time L approximately three
to four hours per day.

(R. 253) Therefore, the child was already
15

in some sort of babysitting arrangement or day care even before
the parties1 divorce.

At the time of the divorce, plaintiff began

working part-time and attending school from one to four hours per
day (R. 253), a small change in lifestyle which would

have

required slightly more time in day care for the child than during
the marriage.

Of course, during both these time periods and

during all time periods since the decree was entered, the
defendant worked full-time at his employment with WICAT and could
not have provided personal, at-home care for the child himself.
In finding that the plaintiff's full-time employment and the
child's full-time enrollment in organized day care constituted a
substantial and material change of circumstances sufficient to
justify reopening the custody issue, the trial court failed to
follow the guidelines found in Marchant v. Marchant, 66 Utah Adv.
Rpt. 45 (September 18, 1987) for making adequate findings in a
custody award.

The Utah Supreme Court had previously held that

the findings should be "sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached."

Acton v. Deliran,

737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987), quoted in Marchant at 47.
Court of Appeals in Marchant understood this to mean that:
a custody award must be firmly anchored on findings of
fact that (1) are sufficiently detailed, (2) include
enough facts to disclose the process through which the
ultimate conclusion is reached, (3) indicate the process
is logical and properly supported, and (4) are not
clearly erroneous.
Id.
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The

Since the trial court decided the custddy issue after finding
substantial changes of circumstance, specif]ic findings regarding
the changes of circumstance, as required inj Marchant, should have
been made by the court.

However, in the instant case, the trial

court did not even attempt to so substantiate its findings with
regard to changes in circumstance—either from the bench or in its
written findings of fact.

These finding s are actually simple

conclusions without any basis in fact, or, are even
assumptions made by the court.

simple

Nowhere in the transcript of

either hearing can an explanation be found for the court's finding
or conclusion that a transition from part-ti me work and part-time
school to full-time work constituted a substantial change of
circumstance.

Neither can an explanation be found for the court's

finding or conclusion that a transition from part-time babysitting
or day care to full-time day care for th^ child constituted a
substantial change of circumstance.

It is obvious that there was

no basis in fact for the trial court's finding regarding this
change of circumstance.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN l(r RULED THAT THE
REMARRIAGE OF DEFENDANT, THE NON-CUSTODjCAL PARENT, TO A
FULL-TIME HOMEMAKER, CONSTITUTED A CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENTLY SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL TO
JUSTIFY REOPENING THE QUESTION OF CUSTODY.
The Utah Supreme Court, relying on the line of cases under
Hogge, recently addressed the issue of changes of circumstance on
behalf of the noncustodial parent in a child! custody modification
procedure.

In Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 62^ (Utah 1987), a fact
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situation existed which was remarkably similar to the instant
case.

The Kramers, during their divorce proceedings, had

stipulated that the custody of the minor child should be awarded
to Mrs. Kramer and that Mrs. Kramer was a fit and proper person to
be awarded custody.

Approximately 1 1/2 years later, Mr. Kramer

filed a petition for modification of the award of custody,
claiming that there existed the necessary changes of circumstances
to warrant reopening the custody decree and transferring custody
of the minor child to him.

Id. at 625.

Mr. Kramerfs evidence at trial included the following facts:
he had obtained further education, a job with substantially
increased income, a new home, and a new wife and a new child, and
his wife and her two children from a previous marriage had formed
good relationships with the minor child of the parties.

He also

alleged that Mrs. Kramer had a host of problems which made her an
unsuitable mother.

Mrs. Kramer's evidence contradicted Mr.

Kramer's evidence regarding her suitability as a parent in almost
every respect.

Id .

The trial court chose to believe Mrs.

Kramer's evidence regarding her suitability as a parent.

Id. at

628.
The Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court had
correctly focused only on changes in circumstances affecting the
custodial parent, rather than the noncustodial parent, when it
found that Mr. Kramer had not successfully passed the first step
of the Hogge two-prong test.

The Court reviewed Becker v. Becker,
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694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984) wherein, in int ^rpreting and applying
Hogge, the Court held that the first step of the Hogge standard
requires that

f,

[t]he asserted change [in c ircumstances] ... have

some material relationship to and substanti al effect on parenting
ability or the functioning of the presen tly existing custodial
relationship." Id. at 626, quoting Becker, supra, at 610, with
emphasis added by the Court in Kramer.
The Court further

noted

that, although

in Hogge the

noncustodial parent established a change ox circumstance on her
part in order to pass the first step of the two-prong test, the
facts of Hogge did not apply to Mr. Kramer.) In Hogge, the father
was originally awarded the custody of the children primarily
because of the mother's temporary inability to care for the
children due to an "emotional illness."

Therefore, the award was

subject to a possible improvement of her emotional health.

In Mr.

Kramer's case, the Court found that the original award of the
custody of the minor child to the mother was not conditioned upon
any temporary circumstances on Mr. Kramer's part.

Kramer at 626.

Kramer firmly establishes that "ordilrnarily the change-ofcircumstances prong of the Hogge test musst focus only on the
custodial parent," unless an exceptional fact situation, as in
Hogge, exists.

Such an exceptional fact situation does not exist

in the instant case.

IcL at 627.

As in Kramer, the parties in the instant case originally
stipulated that the custody of the minor chplld should be awarded
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to plaintiff and that plaintiff was a fit and proper person to be
awarded custody.

Approximately 16 months after the decree became

final, defendant filed a petition for modification of the award of
custody, claiming among other changes of circumstances, that,
because of his remarriage to a full-time homemaker, there existed
the necessary changes of circumstances to warrant reopening the
custody decree and transfer custody of the minor child to him,
(R. 19, 26)
Defendant's evidence at trial included the following: his
income had substantially increased, he had a new wife and a new
child, his new wife would provide full-time babysitting at home
for the child of the parties, and his new wife and her child from
a previous relationship (born after the defendant's remarriage)
had formed a good relationship with the minor child of the
parties.

(R. 258, 276-277, 291)

Defendant also alleged that

plaintiff had some problems which made her an unsuitable mother,
including allegations of instability, concern about the location
of her apartment in Salt Lake City, her full-time work, the
child's

placement

cohabitation,

in a day-care

(R. 275-276)

facility, and

alleged

As in Kramer, plaintiff's evidence

contradicted defendant's evidence regarding her suitability as a
parent in every respect.

The trial court in the instant case

specifically limited its changes of circumstances to plaintiff's
full-time employment, the child's full-time enrollment in day
care, and defendant's remarriage.
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It did not consider the "nit-

picky" accusations of the defendant
suitability as a parent.

Regarding plaintiff's

(R. 317)

D e f e n d a n t s remarriage can only constitute a change of
circumstances under Kramer if it fits the narrow factual exception
found in Hogge—that the defendant was not awarded custody because
he was temporarily incapable of caring for the child and that the
award of custody was subject to or apparently conditioned upon an
improvement in his circumstances. Kramer at 626.

However, in the

instant case, there is no evidence in the st ipulation, findings of
fact, conclusions of law or the decree of divorce that, at the
time of the stipulation of the parties, th& award of custody to
plaintiff was subject to or conditioned upon an improvement in
defendant's circumstances.

To argue tha t the Hogge exception

applies to defendant would be to argue that, because defendant had
not remarried and found a new wife before tjhe divorce action was
concluded, he temporarily could not care for the child and the
award of custody was conditionally given to plaintiff.
such reasoning is ludicrous and inapplicable
stipulated that custody should be awarded
she was a fit parent.

Obviously,

The parties simply
o plaintiff and that

Defendant clearly ddes not fall into the

Hogge exception.
Therefore, under Hogge, Becker, and Kramer, the trial court
should not have considered defendant's remarriage a change of
circumstance sufficient to warrant reopening the custody decree
for consideration by the trial court.
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Th|ere was no evidence

presented that the remarriage of the defendant had a material
relationship to and substantial

effect on the

plaintiff's

parenting ability or the functioning of the existing custodial
relationship.

Becker at 610.

The trial court erred in relying

upon defendants remarriage as a change of circumstance, and the
trial court should have never moved on to the second step of the
Hogge analysis: the reconsideration of the custody award.
IV. EVEN HAD THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
CHANGES OF CIRCUMSTANCE EXISTED, THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY
ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED JOINT CUSTODY OF THE CHILD TO THE
PARTIES AND PHYSICAL CARE, CUSTODY AND CONTROL TO
DEFENDANT.
Hogge dictates that, if the trial court does find that the
moving party has successfully carried the burden of establishing
the necessary changes of circumstance, the court
must consider the changes in circumstance along with all
other evidence relevant to the welfare or best interests
of the child, including the advantage of stability in
custody arrangements that will always weigh against
changes in the party awarded custody. The court must
determine de novo which custody arrangement will serve
the welfare or best interests of the child, and modify,
or refuse to modify, the decree accordingly.
Hogge at 54.
After finding that material and substantial changes of
circumstances existed, the lower court made the following findings
regarding the issue of child custody:
(a)

That the minor

child

should

dwell

in a

stable

environment, and that the defendant could provide better stability
and was in a better position to take care of the minor child at
the present time.

(R. 196)
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(b) That the plaintiff had less time Available to spend with
the minor child, as she was working full-time,
(c)

That there

had been significant

(R. 199)
changes

in the

environment and goals of the plaintiff, and that there had been a
considerable degree of stability of th b environment in the
defendant.

(R. 199)

(d) That the day care center in which the minor was enrolled
appeared to be an excellent facility, but that the stepmother had
developed an excellent loving relationship with the minor child
and would be available as a homemaker in th4 home at times needed
by the child.

The Court also found that the minor child had

seemed to develop an excellent appropriate (relationship with his
stepsister.

(R. 199)

(e) That the custody of the minor child should be modified
to award joint custody to both parties, with the actual physical
care, custody and control being awarded to tpe defendant, and that
the issue of child custody should be reviewed in one year.

(R.

195-196)
The trial court appeared to place grealt emphasis on factors
(2) and (4) of the four factors set forth i|n Pusey v. Pusey, 728
P.2d 117, (Utah 1986):
(1) identity of the primary caretaker during the
marriage, (2) the identity of the pareht with greater
flexibility to provide personal care for the child, (3)
the identity of the parent with whom th^ child has spent
more of his or her time pending custody (determination if
that period has been lengthy, and (4) phe stability of
the environment provided by each parent.
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Id, at 120.
Again, the trial court failed to follow the rules of Marchant
v. Marchant, supra, in making its findings in a custody award.
The court's findings are not sufficiently detailed and do not
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusions on each factual issue were reached.

However,

the trial court's comments at the end of the trial

clearly

indicate that its reasons for awarding the physical care, custody
and control of the child to defendant were exactly the same as its
reasons for finding the changes of circumstance: (1) the change in
plaintiff's work schedule to full-time employment, which had
necessitated the placement of the minor child, Dagin, in a day
care center on a full-time basis, and (2) the remarriage of
defendant and his creation, thereby, of a stable home environment
where the child could be cared for by a stepmother who was not a
horaeraaker, not working outside the home, during those times when
the defendant was working.

(R. 195)

Each finding listed above is

"part and parcel" of the changes of circumstance found by the
trial court and relates to factors (2) and (4) from Pusey: (2) the
identity of the parent with greater flexibility to provide
personal

care for the child, and (4) the stability of the

environment provided by each parent.
In Marchant v. Marchant, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals
dealt specifically with child custody awards and women who must
work.

In Marchant the trial court found that it was in the best
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interests of the children for custody to be awarded to the
defendant (the father).

The court found that the standard of

living under which the mother had been resi ding with the children
in Salt Lake City, Utah, was "not what it should have been nor was
Marchant at 46.

it in the best interests of the children."!

In

addition, the court found that the mother's lifestyle had changed,
pursuant to her desires "and for her benefj^t to the exclusion of
This was a reference to her employment in Salt

the family unit."
Lake City.

Id.

The Utah Court of Appeals held thit the trial court's
findings were "flavored with bias against divorced women, an urban
environment, and women who pursue other than the traditional role
of homemaker."

Id.

The Court also noted that the trial court

appeared, when it referred to the mother's standard of living in
Salt Lake City and her change in her lilfestyle, to apply a
"nebulous, higher standard ... to mothers seeking custody of their
children in a divorce action."

Id.

The Court specifically

addressed the mother's interest in "improving her ability to earn
a living," stating that "this Court will not condone any finding
of fact which might be interpreted as peq alizing a woman for
acquiring

skills

in other

than the mo tst fundamental

and

traditional areas necessary for functioning a^s a wife and mother."
i

Id. at 48.
The trial court in the instant case did, indeed, apply a
"nebulous, higher standard" to the plaintiff(mother in this case.
25

In its comments following the announcement that the court had
found changes of circumstance, the court noted that no day care
center could be a substitute for a mother in the home — in this
case, the mother in the home being the stepmother.

In the same

breath, the court "gave" plaintiff credit for "wanting to and
having to virtually go out and find full time employment."
347, emphasis added)

(R.

Under this reasoning, plaintiff could have

never successfully retained custody of her child in this lower
court.

She was forced, due to her minimal salary of $444.00 and

the defendant's sporadic child support and alimony payments, to
find a full-time job and place her child in full-time day care.
Yet, because defendant had remarried (thereby obtaining fulltime, at-home day care) and had refused to timely pay his
obligations to his former wife, thereby forcing her into fulltime work, he successfully sought and won the physical care,
custody and control of the parties1 minor child!

It did not

matter that he was not available full-time in the home to care for
the child.

Apparently, plaintiff's only salvation would have been

speedy remarriage to a man capable of supporting her and her child
on his salary alone.
It readily appears that the trial court did, indeed, penalize
the plaintiff "for acquiring skills in other than the most
fundamental and traditional areas necessary for functioning as a
wife and mother."

Id. at 48.

Because she could not afford

financially to stay at home with her child, and she was forced to
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step out of the fundamental and traditional areas of a wife and
mother to join the full-time work force, the trial court awarded
the child to defendant; however, the courjt's award was, in all
actuality, an award of custody to defen dant's new wife, the
stepmother

of the child in question, w no would actually be

spending far more time with the child than would the defendant,
who travels as part of his employment.

Fur Jther, the Utah Supreme

Court noted in Hogge that the "extent to which each contesting
parent could care for the child personal ly is an appropriate
consideration for the court." Hogge at 56, rjeferring to Lembach v.
Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200 (Utah 1981) (emphas is added).

The Court

did not include stepparents as parties to be considered in
awarding custody, as did the trial court in the instant case.
Plaintiff

lost physical

custody of her child, not because

defendant could personally spend more time with the child, but
because defendant provided a full-time subslltitute mother who, in
the trial court's opinion, would be better than any day care
center and the child's natural mother added together.
The trial court, although clearly indicating its distaste for
day care centers or preschools, never found that the child had
been adversely affected in any way by his rime spent at the day
care center.

There was no expert finding that the child had been

harmed by enrollment in full-time day care , nor was there any
expert testimony that day care centers are harmful, per se.
Instead, the trial court testified itself as to the lack of
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stability for children in day care centers during its comments
after the presentation of the proffered evidence:
I appreciate day care centers. I appreciate preschools.
My daughter runs one, she has her own. I know how she
loves those kids, but I don't think she is a substitute
for the mother in any fashion, no matter how caring she
is.
I think that is true of any that I have been
acquainted with and any that are in existence. They are
primarily a money making situation. They do care and
they do love. It cannot radiate the stability that is
necessary in a child's life. (R. 319-320)
The classic irony of the court's statement regarding day care
centers as "money-making

situations" is that

plaintiff's

unrebutted proffered testimony was that, before the current court
action began, when defendant and his new wife took care of the
parties' minor child, they required plaintiff to pay them the
normal babysitting fees she would have paid any other babysitter.
(R. 264-265)

When plaintiff babysat for defendant during his

summer visitation with the child

immediately prior to his

remarriage, plaintiff charged him nothing for her babysitting
services.

(R. 263-264)

In the second hearing held November 6, 1987, the court
further stated his opinion regarding day care centers:
What I am concerned with and still am concerned about is
stability of an environment I just don't think that if
mother has to work eight hours a day and put the child
in a day care center then we have an alternative to have
the father take care of the child that is where it ought
to be. If there is no problem with the father and there
is no problem with the father. He is a good provider a
good caretaker and has a stable environment, (sic) (R.
357)
Again, the trial court ignored the fact that it would be the
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stepmother who would be providing the care [for the child, not the
defendant, the father of the child.

It was not the trial court's

task to decide custody between the natural mother and the
stepmother; yet, that is what the court aq tually accomplished,
It, for all intents and purposes, awarded custody of the minor
child to the stepmother of the child, not thje father of the child,
thereby penalizing the mother of the child for entering the work
force on full-time basis and finding that i|t is not possible for
any mother and day care center to provide a Stable environment,
The Utah Supreme Court has consistenjtly held that custody
awards should not be disturbed unless there appears to be a
substantial reason for doing so.

In Trego v. Trego, 565 P.2d 74,

(Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held:
Notwithstanding the desires and contentions of the
parties, the welfare of the children i|s the paramount
consideration of the courts, and where custody has been
determined, and the children appear to be comparatively
well adjusted and happy, they should not be compelled to
change their home unless there appears some substantial
reason for doing so.
There was no substantial reason for changing the award of
custody in the instant case.

The trial court relied upon changes

of circumstance which are not valid and then used those same
changes of circumstance as justifications for awarding the
physical care, custody and control of th& minor child to the
defendant.

The trial court failed to find that the child was

harmed or affected in any way by his enrollment in full-time day
care, failed to demonstrate why the day car^ center environment
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was unstable, and, by awarding the child to the defendant,
actually awarded the child to the stepmother and penalized the
plaintiff for her decision to enter the work force full-time. The
trial court's award of physical care, custody, and control of the
child to defendant was clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, IN MODIFYING THE
AWARD OF CHILD CUSTODY, IT RULED THAT DEFENDANT SHOULD
PAY PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $250.00 PER MONTH DURING THE
THREE-MONTH SUMMER VISITATION AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF.
Because the trial court should not have disturbed

the

previous award of child custody to the plaintiff, it should have
more fully considered plaintiff's counter petition for an increase
in child

support and awarded the plaintiff a substantially

increased amount of child support on a twelve-month basis.

The

trial court made no finding as to why it chose the sum of $250.00
for child support to be paid to plaintiff during the three-month
summer visitation, failing to relate this sum to the defendant's
income, as found in his financial declaration.

The court merely

indicated that this sum
may seem a little exorbitant, but it is certainly not
exorbitant. When you consider the difference in the
earning capacity, when you consider the fact that where
she is going to have that kind of visitation, plus
weekend visitations, and she is going to need a little
extra money to provide some of the needs for the child
during those three month periods and for weekend
visitations, this is not exorbitant, (sic) (R. 321)
The court also noted that it "sort of took" the federal and
state tax exemptions into consideration when it raised the child
support to $250.00 for the three summer months of visitation.
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(R.

324)
The trial court again failed to adequately substantiate its
findings in this case.

The financial dkeclaration filed by

defendant at the time of trial indicated a giross monthly income of
$2,630.00.

(R. 142)

Defendant could certai|iInly afford to pay more

than $150.00 per month, or even $250.00 per month, for the support
of his child.

The trial court failed to make any finding

regarding the comparative incomes of the parties, only noting, as
above, that there was a difference in the earning capacity of the
parties.
Upon remand and reconsideration, whilch is the plaintiff's
requested relief regarding this issue, the trial court should be
instructed to fully consider the plaintiff is Counter Petition to
Modify and to enter complete findings of fabt as to its award of
increased child support to be paid by defendant.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SET THE PREVIOUS
AWARD OF ALIMONY FOR REVIEW IN ONE YEAR I
The trial court, although it did not alter the award of
alimony, set the issue of alimony for review in one year,
indicating that
[a]fter one year I will give consideration to cutting
alimony off because I don't think thisi is a situation
that requires alimony to go on forever.i As a matter of
fact the trend is away from alimony andi only in 20 per
cent of the cases across the nation is alimony ever
awarded anymore. I suppose it is getting less. Utah is
no different than the national trend I am advised.
Yet again, the trial court failed to make any specific
findings regarding this issue.

Specifically, the court found no
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change of circumstances, other than alleged national trends, which
would justify a reconsideration of the previous alimony award.
Defendant also failed in his proffered testimony to offer any
change of circumstances which would justify the reduction of
alimony; an allusion to the defendant's financial declaration was
his only attempt to establish any changes of circumstances worthy
of eliminating the award of alimony to plaintiff.

(R. 313) There

was clearly no reason to set a review regarding the award of
alimony and this review should be stricken.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
AWARDED THE 1987 AND 1988 FEDERAL AND STATE
INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR THE MINOR CHILD TO
DEFENDANT.
The trial court ruled that the defendant should be allowed
both the 1987 and 1988 federal and state income tax exemptions for
the minor child, finding that defendant would be "in primary
custody at the end of 1987 and for the bulk of 1988."

(R. 321)

When questioned several minutes later by plaintiff's counsel, who
reminded the court that plaintiff had been the primary custodian
for most of the present year (1987) and that the defendant had
only been paying $150.00 per month (which would be a total of
$1,800.00 for a twelve-month year), the court, nevertheless, noted
that defendant "had the child a good deal of the time during 1987
and from a tax standpoint it is going to make considerable
difference with him as he would be in a much higher tax bracket
than she is."

(R. 323-324)

This is contrary to the defendant's

own proffered testimony, which indicated
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that during

1987

defendant had only his normal visitation wi th the child, as well
as several other miscellaneous weeks.

(R. 273)

By no stretch of

the imagination did the defendant have thej child a good deal of
the time during 1987. Of course, as 1988 prtbgresses, the child is
currently residing with plaintiff and woiuld only reside with
defendant on a full-time basis if this Couift were to uphold the
trial court's custody decision.
In the November 6, 1987 hearing the trial court gave new
meaning to the term "primary care provider."

Plaintiff1s attorney

attempted again to clarify with the cour ft which party should
receive the 1987 tax exemptions.
defendant

When the court stated that

"still was the primary

care provider

in 1987,"

plaintiff's counsel asked, "Time-wise?" to which the court
replied, "Dollar-wise."

(R. 348)

Even under this new "primary

care provider" standard, at $150.00 per montl^, defendant could not
have possibly provided the primary financial support for the minor
child of the parties.

The trial court provided him with an almost

dollar-for-dollar tax benefit.
Clearly, the trial court erred in making this determination
of the award of the 1987 tax exemptions and these exemptions
should have been awarded to plaintiff.

The 1988 tax exemptions

should, as clearly, be awarded to plaintiff i f this Court reverses
the trial court's custody decision, as she wo|uld then be providing
the majority of the minor child's support.
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CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
The individual aspects of the relief sought are by-products
of the requested reversal of the trial court's award of joint
custody to the two parties, with actual physical care, custody and
control to the defendant.

More specifically, plaintiff seeks the

following:
1.

Child Custody:

a reversal of the Order modifying the

child custody arrangement.

Plaintiff seeks a return to the

original award of care, custody and control of the minor child to
herself, which would be a reversal of the trial court's award of
joint custody to both parties, with actual physical care, custody
and control awarded to defendant.
2.

Review:

a reversal of the Order scheduling a review for

October 13, 1988 before the trial court regarding the issues of
child custody and alimony.

If care, custody and control of the

minor child are returned to plaintiff, no review would be
necessary.

As there was no evidence offered regarding a change of

circumstances with respect to alimony, and there was not, indeed,
any such change of circumstances, no review of the original
alimony award would be necessary.
3.

Child Support:

a reversal of the Order modifying the

previous child support award.

Plaintiff seeks a return to the

original award of year-round child support and an increase
child support based upon defendant's ability to pay.

in

This would

be a reversal of the trial court's award of child support in the
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increased amount of $250.00 for only the thbee summer months when
plaintiff has the actual physical care, custody, and control of
the minor child.

Defendant can certainly afford to pay $250.00

per month year-round and can, most likely, pisay substantially more.
4.

Visitation:

a reversal of the Order modifying the

original visitation schedule.

Plaintiff s|^eks a return to the

original visitation schedule, in which d<efendant was the non
custodial parent and had the same visitaltion privileges that
plaintiff has now been awarded by the trial court.
5.

Tax Exemptions:

decree of divorce.

a reversal of the Order modifying the

Plaintiff should be awarded the 1987 and 1988

federal and state tax exemptions for the mi|nor child, as well as
all future exemptions.

No one-year review ^hould be necessary on

this issue.
6.

Attorneyfs Fees:

an award of attorney's fees and costs

to plaintiff to be paid by defendant for plaintiff's attorney's
benefit.

Plaintiff does not have the financial resources to pay

her attorney's fees and costs in this appeal, yet she has been
forced to incur such fees and costs to pursbe her rights in this
matter.

Plaintiff respectfully urges this Court to find the

trial court's award of joint custody to the parties, with physical
care, custody and control to the defendant, erroneous, as well as
the court's other rulings regarding child skupport, alimony, and
federal and state income tax exemptions.

Plaintiff also

respectfully urges this Court to award her reasonable attorney's
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fees which she has incurred in this appeal process.
DATED this 12th day of February, 1988.
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Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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